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Abstract—ATFM slot-swapping represents the first step towards 
the participation of airspace users (AUs) in air traffic 
management and airport collaborative processes. SESAR is 
advancing this through development of the user driven 
prioritisation process (UDPP) to achieve additional flexibility for 
AUs to adapt their operations in a more cost-efficient manner in 
the presence of unforeseen demand and capacity imbalances that 
require the application of delays to flights. The contribution of 
this paper is twofold: (i) to present the challenges achieved so far 
with respect to UDPP concepts, in particular regarding fleet 
delay apportionment and selective flight protection; (ii) to pave 
the way towards future UDPP concepts through the introduction 
of enhanced selective flight protection. 
Keywords-air traffic flow and capacity management (ATFCM), 
flexibility, hotspot, low-volume user in a constraint (LVUC), 
SESAR, user driven prioritisation process (UDPP). 
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The impact of demand-capacity imbalances
Demand-capacity imbalances in Europe affected
approximately 15% of flights in 2015, i.e., this proportion of 
flights either had an air traffic flow management (ATFM) slot 
or was otherwise regulated at airports [1]. The average impact 
of en-route ATFM delays, in 2015, was a delay of 0.73 minutes 
per flight on average [2], as compared with a target 
performance (ibid. p.23) of 0.5 minute per flight. It has been 
estimated that irregular operations may cost airlines some 2-3% 
of annual revenue [3] and have a significant impact on airlines’ 
annual costs and revenues. ATFM delays are one of many such 
irregularities, but one over which airlines have little influence. 
To mitigate such impacts, flights are (sometimes) 
prioritised to redistribute delay on the basis of the 
consequences on operations and costs, which could be due to 
factors such as crew out-of-hours constraints, maintenance slot 
requirements (such as a ramp check), passenger missed-
connection costs, high-yield passenger business-retention 
(‘soft’) costs, or a missed airport curfew, etc. 
Today, the air traffic management (ATM) system in Europe 
allows little flexibility to airspace users (AUs). Take for 
example ATFM slot swapping: in 2013, 1548 swaps [4, p.39] 
over 9.6 million flights represented less than 0.2% of all flights 
[5]. More flexibility, i.e. the ability of the ATM system to 
accommodate AUs’ changing business priorities, could result 
in a better recovery process with substantial reductions of 
operational and cost impacts. Flexibility and equity (in the 
sense that one AU’s prioritisation does not negatively impact 
another’s) are key considerations. 
B. The current prioritisation process
Since the mid-1990s, airspace users in Europe have been
able to use ATFM slot-swapping to reduce their costs in the 
face of delays. If delays occur due to ATFM regulations, they 
can request the swapping of two flights involved in the same 
most penalising regulation. 
SESAR has increased AU flexibility through early user-
driven prioritisation process (UDPP) developments in Step 1. 
Enhanced ATFM slot swapping (ESS) offers an estimated 
average benefit (in terms of avoided losses) of EUR 4900 per 
swap for the AU [4, p.44]. The business case for ESS over 20 
years is in the order of magnitude of hundreds of millions of 
euros [6]. ESS will be deployed by EUROCONTROL in 2017. 
Also an early development at airports, departure reordering can 
be requested in the context of airport collaborative decision-
making (CDM), and UDPP has included an automated process 
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for such reordering requests in the pre-departure sequence at 
CDG Airport, where important benefits have been measured 
during the demonstration project ‘DFlex’ [7], [8]. 
Those short-term improvements increase the AU’s 
flexibility in the tactical phase. In certain circumstances, 
greater strategic mitigation can be effected earlier in the 
planning phase by AUs’ flight operation centres - for example, 
by looking ahead to likely hotspots (due to capacity 
constrained situations) later in the day and pre-planning the 
response (these terms are defined in section II.A). 
C. Incentive to change 
The current ATM environment based on static flight plans 
(time-based operations) is evolving through SESAR towards a 
trajectory-based environment in order to improve airport and 
ATM network performance. Better performance of ATM 
operations depends on improved knowledge of the true demand 
at the planning stage and on better adherence to the plan during 
operations. 
Beyond slot swapping, the aim of UDPP is to provide AUs 
with more flexibility to rearrange flight sequences during 
hotspots, through AU-driven prioritisation. Airspace users’ 
participation in ATM and airport collaborative processes, 
including UDPP executed in such a way that the performance 
of all stakeholders is considered, is essential to minimise the 
impacts of deteriorated operations on all such stakeholders. 
UDPP applies to departure, to en-route travel and to arrival, 
principally in a hotspot. Only UDPP for departure hotspots has 
been validated to date, although with very promising initial 
results also observed for arrival processes. 
D. UDPP as a viable solution 
As introduced in section A, capacity constraints and 
congestion impose large costs on airlines and passengers alike, 
with no significant capacity increases expected in the near- or 
medium-term. A thorough review, examining research trends 
and opportunities with regard to the management of air 
transportation demand and capacity is presented [9]. Directions 
for improvement through marginal capacity increases and 
better management of demand and available capacity are 
discussed, in addition to potential airline and state strategic 
initiatives. 
Research into flight prioritisation methods covers a range of 
approaches. A points system based on flights (tending to favour 
smaller-aircraft operators), distances flown and seat-miles is 
explored in [10]. Credit-based human-in-the-loop simulations 
are investigated in [11] and a novel approach of assigning 
alternative routes with prioritisations is presented in [12]. 
Combinatorial auctions have been assessed in [13] in an 
optimisation approach for flight prioritisation, in a paper 
examining monetary and non-monetary mechanisms. A 
comprehensive NextGen review [14] established four 
prioritisation mechanisms as the most promising, out of ten 
mechanisms reviewed: priority-by-schedule; best-performing, 
best-served; priority points (similar to the operating credits of 
UDPP Step 2, discussed below) and non-monetary market 
mechanisms (such as auctions, advance contracts and 
congestion pricing). 
Resulting from an iterative UDPP concept elaboration and 
validation process involving AU representatives (Air France, 
Austrian, British Airways, the European Low Fares Airline 
Association, HOP!, the International Air Transport 
Association, SWISS, Turkish) since 2012, two new concept 
components, fleet delay apportionment (FDA), and selective 
flight protection (SFP), as shown in Table I below, can be 
employed to facilitate anticipative management of flight 
schedules. 
Underpinning SFP is the ‘ration-by-effort’ (RBE) principle 
- first give, then receive. Each AU may voluntarily participate, 
by suspending a flight (i.e., moving it later in a departure 
sequence), for which it receives operating credits that may be 
used to benefit other flights of its own by protecting them: 
those protected flights revert to being almost on-time and 
flights from other AUs may also benefit from this move. RBE 
thus gives incentives to participants that generate positive 
externalities for other users (i.e., contribute to reduce the delay 
to other flights). Other rationing mechanisms have been 
compared in the literature, such as rationing by passengers, 
aircraft size or flight duration [15], with ration-by-schedule 
(slots assigned in order of scheduled arrival time) often 
preferred, for example when airline and passenger equity are 
primary concerns (ibid.) and for delivering minimum total 
delay under market principles [16]. RBS has also been 
explored in the collaborative-decision making context, relaxing 
slot ownership, also under market principles [17]. 
For UDPP, equity is the main constraint: the actions of one 
AU must not impact another’s flights. The expected benefits of 
UDPP to AUs arise from a reduction of delay and cost for 
important flights during a hotspot. The UDPP concept allows 
the AUs to redistribute the delay across its fleet, through 
prioritisation of flights with high economic value over flights 
with lower economic value. The overall delay of all the flights 
in the hotspot remains the same (c.f. for FDA, the total delay 
remains the same for each AU). 
TABLE I.  ANTICIPATIVE MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES 





AUs give relative priorities to their flights. 
For flights that become involved in a 
hotspot, the system apportions the delay 





AUs ‘protect’ important flights relative to 
the schedule, to the detriment of less 
important flights that are moved to the end 
of the hotspot and are ‘UDPP-suspended’ 
The final decision regarding the revised flight sequence is 
the result of a collaborative process involving all stakeholders 
(AUs, network management function, airports, flow managers, 
and air traffic control) and is currently created and managed by 
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(overloaded) situations. After safety priorities, the focus for 
ATM is to ensure optimised capacity and to expedite the 
recovery of the hotspot (by using 100% of available resources, 
such as runway throughput) until no delay remains. The AUs 
will focus on tactical costs (e.g., efficiently managing 
passenger delay) and operating close to schedule, especially for 
important flights, to avoid airport curfew infringements, 
aircraft out of position, and crew assignment issues, etc. 
E. Structure of the paper 
In the next section, the UDPP concept and definitions are 
presented in more detail, before an extended mechanism 
(enhanced selective flight protection) is introduced in section 
III. In section IV, wider conclusions are drawn and we take a 
look ahead to future research. 
II. UDPP CONCEPT AND DEFINITIONS 
A. Environment 
The future SESAR Step 2 environment in which UDPP was 
devised is a continuous process of detection of demand-
capacity imbalance, where the confidence in data becomes one 
of the major drivers in decision-making. 
When a constraint arises at a local level, e.g., at an airport, 
impacting the airport actors on elements such as landing or 
departure runway capacity, the capacity constrained situation is 
declared for such elements, with a start and end time, per cent 
of remaining capacity, and a confidence index (CI). 
This declaration triggers the definition of hotspots defined 
by the DCB processes per traffic volume within a time window 
(e.g., airport landing or airport departure), and managed by the 
local (airport) DCB processes. 
A hotspot is defined by its stress period (during which 
demand is over the available capacity) and the recovery period 
(time needed to return to no-delay for all flights): i.e., hotspot = 
stress period + recovery period.  
More than one hotspot can be defined within a capacity 
constraint, as shown in Fig. 1. In that case, UDPP addresses 
each one independently. 
If there are dependency links between flights (due to 
aircraft, crew, connecting passengers, etc), they shall be 
managed by the AU through shared business trajectory (SBT) 
management and flight rotation management. 
B. UDPP characteristics 
1) Baseline delay 
When a hotspot is detected, DCB applies a ‘smoothing’ 
policy (e.g., according to first-planned, first-served in the 
European ATFM system today) to allocate a delay to each 
flight involved in the hotspot. This baseline delay is used by 
the UDPP mechanism as reference value to calculate the delay 
after flight prioritisation, in particular at airports. UDPP allows 
airspace users to prioritise their flights in terms of IBT (in-
block time) or OBT (off-block time). It defines a new 
UIBT/UOBT (UDPP in-block time/UDPP off-block time) that 
becomes the new demand from the AU in the hotspot. (It is 
important to note that these new times are still subject to 
change based on ATC constraints and optimisations). 
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2) UDPP equity 
All UDPP features are based on a very important 
characteristic: the equity between AUs, which prevents one 
AU’s prioritisation actions from impacting negatively on the 
flights of others.  
The implementation of equity in the UDPP algorithm uses 
the baseline delay, defined as the amount of delay a flight 
would be assigned if no UDPP prioritisation were applied. The 
total baseline delay of each AU in a constraint should remain 
the same as, or less than, the level before UDPP. Only those 
AUs that suspend flights to be able to prioritise may incur more 
delays (but with fewer cost impacts).  
3) UDPP prioritisation 
During UDPP prioritisation, the ability to re-organise the 
flights list in a hotspot is given to AUs. The outcome of the AU 
prioritisation does not impact the hotspot itself (same duration 
and same list of flights). 
The UDPP prioritisation process is based on two features 
that AUs can use independently, or at the same time, depending 
on their needs: FDA and SFP. In the following sections we 
present briefly FDA first, and then SFP in more detail, as it is 
the basis for the following section on enhanced SFP (ESFP). 
C. Fleet delay apportionment 
The fleet delay apportionment component of UDPP Step 2 
provides prioritisation options to AUs that recognise that some 
of their flights will have to operate behind schedule due to a 
hotspot and want control over how much each flight will be 
delayed. With FDA, each AU can distribute the amount of 
delay it must absorb among its flights, via a priority given to 
each flight. 
The FDA priority value can be given prior to the hotspot 
declaration according to the business priority of a flight. These 
values could typically be set by the AU at the time of planning, 
before any hotspot is signalled by DCB. However, nothing in 
the concept prevents an AU from adding, removing or 
modifying FDA priority values after a hotspot appears. 
The allowable FDA values are integers 1 through 9, with a 
value of 1 indicating the highest priority flights and of 9 
indicating the lowest priority. 
D. Selective flight protection 
Selective flight protection allows an AU to protect some of 
its flights in the sequence, in exchange for the suspension of its 
other flights in the same hotspot. SFP entitles prioritised flights 
to operate at, or close to, their schedule.  
In section II.D, we introduced the principle of ration-by-
effort (RBE) and how this applies to SFP; we also introduced 
the main UDPP constraint of equity.  
The third principle is that with SFP, AUs can (see Fig. 2): 
• Suspend (UDPP-suspend) a flight: it will be pushed to 
the end of the hotspot. For convenience, we will use 
the term “suspension” in place of “UDPP-suspension” 
in the rest of the paper. 
• Protect a flight: it will be on time. 
Depending on operational considerations (e.g., the delay 
duration), the AU may ultimately decide to cancel a suspended 




Figure 2.  Selective flight protection high level description 
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1) SFP operating index definition 
It is assumed that the DCB function can predict the 
demand-capacity imbalance accurately to develop an operating 
index - associated with a confidence index - on which AU 
prioritisation can be based. 
The operating index (OI) is nominally 100 and will be 
greater than 100 when demand exceeds the available capacity. 
During the stress period, only a part of the demand can be 
accommodated (e.g., 75%). This ratio between the demand and 
the available capacity during the stress period drives the 
calculation of the OI as in (1), where D is the number of flights 
during the stress period and C the capacity during the stress 
period (i.e., number of available positions in the sequence). 
 OI = 100 x D/C (1) 
If only 75% of the flights are satisfied during the stress 
period, the OI is 133, calculated as the ratio 100/0.75.  
During the recovery period, the OI/OC principles and use 
do not change with an OI value set to the last published OI in 
the stress period. 
2) SFP operating credits definition 
The operating credits are used to protect flights while 
respecting the constraint in the hotspot and the equity between 
AUs: 
• Originally, each flight has 100 operating credits. 
• An AU can suspend any flight, which simultaneously 
liberates its 100 OCs and moves the suspended flight 
to operate at the end of the hotspot (but still within it). 
• Once it has liberated OCs by suspending flights, the 
AU can protect a number of its flights, this number 
depending on the OI (i.e., on the severity of the 
congestion): in this case, liberated OCs are allocated to 
those protected flights so that each protected flight has 
a number of OC equal to the OI.  
• A flight whose OCs are equal to the OI will operate at 
(or as close as possible to) the original schedule. 
Therefore, the number of flights that an AU can protect as a 
reward for a single suspension is OC/(OI-100). If this ratio is 
not an integer, then, given that one cannot protect half a flight, 
some of the liberated operating credits are not usable. Unused 
OCs can be used in future possible variations of the OI and are 
referred to as ‘leftover’ operating credits. 
Fig. 3 below presents the evolution of the OCs (blue line) 
depending on the suspensions and protections made by an AU 
during a hotspot characterised by an operating index of 140. 
It should be noted that when one or more AU uses SFP, in 
most cases this reduces the total delay for the other AUs as 
well. 
3) Validity of the operating credits 
An AU’s flight can be protected only if the AU has 
sufficient operating credits to assign to it, i.e., after an effort 
has been made through suspension of another flight. When a 
flight is suspended, it liberates OCs only at its original schedule 
time – because the suspension liberates a space in the sequence 
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The AU can then use these liberated OCs to protect any 
flight(s) with a scheduled time later than the position of the 
suspended flight, and in the same hotspot.  
If a modification of the OI is published, a complete 
recalculation of the SFP values is performed to re-assess each 
flight status: suspended or protected. A new flight situation 
results in which if the OCs needed to protect a flight are not 
sufficient anymore, the flight is no longer protected: only 
compatible protected flights (with sufficient OCs available at 
the time of protection) will remain protected. Non-compatible 
flights return to their baseline delay. 
4) Use of leftover operating credits 
Leftover OCs can originate from several situations such as: 
• The OI/OC ratio does not give a clear-cut number of 
flights that can be protected. 
• Flights were protected but the OI changes and some 
OCs cannot be used anymore. 
• The AU does not need/cannot use all its liberated OCs 
in the hotspot. 
The question of what constitutes an allowable use for 
leftover OCs remaining after SFP decisions has been an open 
issue in UDPP. These leftover OCs could be: 
• Exchanged with other AUs as a result of negotiation. 
• Given to other alliance members to protect the network 
of the AU’s alliance. 
• Put in a ‘common pot’ for use by AUs that have only a 
few flights in the hotspot; these so-called low volume 
airspace users in a constraint (LVUC), could be either 
scheduled AUs with only a few/one flight(s) involved 
in the hotspot, or business or general aviation operating 
at an airport often but on an ad hoc basis. 
• Several LVUCs (e.g., business aviation operators), 
may group their UDPP operations together in order to 
behave as a single ‘virtual’ AU. 
These different possibilities, not explored as part of the 
UDPP mechanisms elaboration so far, are not developed 
further in the present document. However, one potential use of 
leftover OCs in future hotspots has been investigated and is 
presented in the next section. 
III. ENHANCED SELECTIVE FLIGHT PROTECTION 
MECHANISM 
According to SFP principles and rules, OCs obtained in a 
hotspot cannot be used to protect flights outside it, i.e., in other 
hotspots that may occur in a different place and/or at a different 
time. This restriction may unnecessarily penalise AUs with a 
low number of flights, i.e., LVUCs (see section 0). In fact, 
LVUCs usually have fewer chances to take advantage of the 
flexibility provided by the SFP mechanism than the other AUs. 
For instance, if the OI of a hotspot is 115, an AU suspending 
one flight can protect six other flights (100/(115-100)). 
However, an AU with fewer than six flights cannot fully 
exploit its effort (i.e., the suspension). Likewise, an AU that 
operates just one single flight in a period and region affected by 
congestion will never be able to prioritise it, as it cannot make 
any prior suspension. This situation applies, for instance, to 
business aviation operators, that usually have only a few flights 
involved in a given hotspot. Similarly, a large AU may 
sometimes be classified as an LVUC at a spoke airport. Hence, 
any AU can be considered as an LVUC, depending on the 
circumstances. 
The extended selective flight protection (ESFP) mechanism 
widens the scope of SFP to allow leftover OCs accumulated by 
an LVUC in a hotspot to be used in other hotspots (occurring in 
a different space and/or time). ESFP improves the equity level 
of SFP as it makes it possible to compensate LVUCs for their 
current and previous efforts, which - under SFP - provides 
benefits to other AUs only.  
A. Equivalence factor for credits in different hotspots 
ESFP allows LVUCs to save unused credits in hotspot i and 
carry them over to hotspot j. However, the carried-over credits 
should be weighted with an equivalence factor (EFi,j) to 
preserve two key SFP’s conditions, i.e., 1) no reward is given 
without a previous effort; and 2) no negative (significant) 
impact is allowed in the aggregated delay of other AUs. The 
equivalence factor between hotspots i and j is defined as in (2), 
where ω is the duration (in minutes) of the hotspot taking into 
account the stress and recovery periods in order to consider the 
differences between the hotspots in terms of demand-capacity 
imbalance, as shown in Fig. 4.  
The second hotspot has a longer duration due to the lower 
capacity available during the recovery period, which can be 
used to absorb the excess demand after the stress period. 
Hence, the average delay will be larger than in the first hotspot, 
even if both have the same imbalance during the stress period. 
Such differences in the duration of hotspots must be taken into 
account to preserve the equity among AUs if OCs are brought 
from one hotspot to another. 
 EFij = ωi/ωj (2) 
In a simplified scenario where credits can only be 
transferred from hotspot i to hotspot j, ESFP calculates the 
number of credits Cri and Crj for any AU as in (3) and (4), 
where Si, Sj and Pi, Pj represent the number of suspended and 
protected flights in hotspots i and j, respectively. Cri and Crj are 
non-negative. 
 Cri = 100 x Si – (OIi – 100) x Pi (3) 
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 Figure 4.  Different hotspots depending on their duration 
Equations (3) and (4) can be recursively applied to use 
credits in multiple hotspots: if credits obtained in hotspot i (3) 
are used first in hotspot j (4) and later in hotspot k (i.e., k uses 
the remaining credits of j that in turn were the remaining 
credits from i), (3) is to be applied for j and then (4) for k. 
Therefore, the credits granted in i are weighted both in j and k. 
B. Example of ESFP application 
To illustrate the ESFP concept and how the equivalence 
factor works, a scenario composed of two hotspots H1 and H2 
and based on realistic traffic data is presented in Table II. 
TABLE II.  HOTSPOTS CHARACTERISTICS FOR ESFP APPLICATION 
Hotspot 
Parameters 
C D OI  ω 
H1 20 27 135 300 
H2 20 23 115 250 
If an LVUC in hotspot H1 suspends only one flight (SH1=1) 
it is rewarded with 100 OCs. If it protects only another one 
(PH1 = 1), the amount of leftover operational credits at the end 
of hotspot H1 is calculated according to (5). 
 CrH1 = 100 x 1 – (135 – 100) x 1 = 65 (5) 
This AU could protect 1 flight more in H1 with these 
remaining credits as a compensation for the delay reduction 
caused to other AUs. In the case that it decides to keep the 
credits and use them in a new hotspot H2, according to (4) and 
the definition of equivalence factor EF (2), the number of 
credits available in H2 (previous to any cancellation or 
suspension in H2, i.e., SH2=0 and PH2=0) is calculated as 
indicated in (6). 
  CrH2 = 65 x 300/250 = 78 (6) 
Hence, this AU can protect a maximum of 78/(115-100)=5 
flights in H2 (instead of 65/(115-100)=4) as a reward for the 
delay reduction caused to the other AUs in H1 (note that H1’s 
duration is longer than H2’s; thus the average delay in H1 is 
larger than in H2, and this is why a suspension in H1 allows the 
AU to protect as a reward more flights in H2 than in H1). 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND LOOK AHEAD 
Future tactical priorities in ATM identified in [9] include: 
(i) incorporating robustness into ATFM allocation decisions; 
(ii) integrated modelling of airline operations recovery with 
real-time information regarding passengers, crew, and flights; 
(iii) enabling a dynamic exchange of recovery capacity across 
airlines, airports, ANSP and Network ATM actors, and time 
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Regarding (i), a series of human-in-the-loop validation 
exercises with airspace users on the SFP and FDA mechanisms 
has allowed us to mature the concept with regard to its 
feasibility and benefits, and further validation involving the 
ATM and airport actors is planned in SESAR2020 to complete 
such integration. In addition, performance modelling will be 
carried out, where challenges remain regarding the integration 
of uncertainty into both the modelling and application of 
ATFM in general, and prioritisation mechanisms in particular. 
Further research, planned by the authors of this paper, includes 
the incorporation of uncertainty (e.g., due to unpredictable 
events and changes in decision-making) into future models and 
an examination of how this impacts the robustness of solutions. 
This will also include the use of larger traffic data samples 
(particularly those with sufficient inclusion of common LVUC 
traffic mixes) and simulations to allow both the performance 
assessment of UDPP and the further exploration of 
assumptions made regarding on-going ESFP development and 
the extent to which it may be effectively generalised to all 
airspace users and across different hotspots. This generates 
further intriguing challenges that we have not had space to 
explore in this initial paper, particularly with regard to the 
usage, applicability, transferability and expiry of ‘leftover’ 
operating credits. Such future research will also need to 
establish metrics and indicators that can measure the impact of 
ESFP on established key performance areas (KPAs) – these 
impacts are currently relatively poorly understood, with hardly 
any insights available into the trade-offs between them. 
Integrating prioritisation solutions with irregular operations 
recovery software (such as passenger reaccommodation and 
crew rostering tools), as flagged in (ii), remains a highly 
promising target for future development. Only with truly 
joined-up solutions will the effort invested in flight 
prioritisations return the highest benefits. This should include 
solutions minimising the cost of delay for airlines, which is 
well-established as a non-linear function of delay duration, and 
thus introduces interesting new relationships into the 
parameterisation and optimisation of prioritisation sequencing. 
The ultimate goal of fully integrated planning and 
collaborative decision making across stakeholders and time, as 
per (iii), remains some way off, although this will inevitably be 
underpinned by system-wide information management 
(SWIM), at the core of SESAR, and will probably require 
further enhanced tools for the exchange of information relating 
to the margins of airspace user adaptability, which may be 
based on airline cost and passenger data. Nevertheless, clear 
progress is being made, some of which we have sought to share 
in this paper, such that improving airspace user flexibility, 
across all airspace user types, shows much promise for UDPP 
developments in SESAR 2020. 
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